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Internalism	and	Prudential	Value		Jennifer	Hawkins			 Many	 philosophers	 accept	 that	 prudential	 value	 is	 a	 distinct	 type	 of	 value,	different	both	from	moral	value	and	also	from	general	non-moral	goodness.1	Those	who	(like	myself)	accept	 the	category	of	prudential	value	think	of	 it	as	 the	type	of	value	 at	 stake	 when	 we	 say	 that	 something	 is	 non-morally	 good	 for	 a	 particular	person.	It	is	the	kind	of	value	theories	of	welfare	or	well-being	are	about.	It	is	what	we	seek	for	ourselves	on	those	occasions	when	we	seek	our	own	self-interest.	And	it	is	the	kind	of	value	we	seek	to	realize	for	others	when	we	try	to	benefit	them.	There	are	many	 interesting	and	 (relatively)	underexplored	 foundational	questions	about	prudential	 value.	 This	 paper	 is	 concerned	 with	 whether	 or	 not	 some	 form	 of	existence	 internalism	(defined	below)	holds	 for	prudential	value,	and	 if	 so	what	 it	amounts	to.2			 	Existence	 internalism	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 necessary	 connection	between	something’s	having	a	certain	positive	normative	status	(its	being	right	or	its	 being	 intrinsically	 prudentially	 good)	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 elicit	 positive	psychological	 responses	 from	 human	 subjects.3	Existence	 internalism	 is	 typically	contrasted	 with	 judgment	 internalism,	 which	 is	 a	 claim	 about	 what	 follows,	 as	 a	matter	 of	 conceptual	 content,	 from	 sincere	 judgments	 about	 value.4 	Existence	internalism,	however,	is	a	metaphysical	thesis,	not	a	conceptual	one.		
																																																								1	Philosophers	differ	in	how	they	carve	up	value.	For	example,	Moore	(1903)	and	Scanlon	(1998)	are	skeptical	 of	 the	 very	 idea	of	 prudential	 value	 that	 is	 relative	 to	 individuals.	However,	 they	 are	not	skeptical	of	the	idea	of	general,	non-relational	non-moral	goodness.	Others	who	discuss	general,	non-relational	 goodness	 take	 the	 notion	 of	 intrinsic	 goodness	 to	 be	 primarily	 a	 moral	 notion	(Zimmerman,	2015).	2	The	 idea	 that	some	 form	of	 internalism	must	hold	 for	prudential	welfare	 is	 commonly	expressed,	but	 there	are	 relatively	 few	explicit	discussions	of	what	 such	a	 constraint	might	 amount	 to.	At	 the	time	 this	 essay	 was	 written	 in	 2014,	 the	 main	 discussions	 of	 prudential	 internalism	 were	 Rosati	(1996),	Velleman	(2000),	Rosati	(1996),	and	Sarch	(2011).	Since	then	there	have	been	several	new	additions	to	the	literature.	See	in	particular	Dorsey	(2017)	and	Heathwood	(ms.).		3	The	 term	 ‘existence	 internalism’	 and	 its	 close	 relative	 ‘judgment	 internalism’	 come	 from	Darwall	(1983:	54).		A	similar	distinction	with	different	labels	occurs	in	Brink	(1989:	40).		4		 Smith	 (1994)	 defends	 moral	 judgment	 internalism.	 For	 detailed	 surveys	 of	 the	 many	 forms	metaethical	internalism	can	take	and	the	relevance	for	particular	debates	see,	Van	Roojen	(2015)	and	Rosati	(2016).		
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	 Put	 another	 way,	 it	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 facts	 about	 human	 psychological	responsiveness	constrain	 the	metaphysics	of	value	 in	particular	ways.	Attempts	 to	specify	 existence	 internalism	 for	 a	 particular	 domain	of	 value	 are	 attempts	 to	 say	what	 the	 metaphysical	 constraints	 are	 for	 that	 type	 of	 value.	 Peter	 Railton	characterizes	 the	 task	 in	 terms	 of	 avoiding	 “alienness.”	 He	 writes,	 “What	 is	intrinsicially	valuable	for	a	person	must	have	a	connection	with	what	he	would	find	to	 some	 degree	 compelling	 or	 attractive,	 at	 least	 if	 he	 were	 rational	 or	 aware.	 It	would	be	an	 intolerably	alienated	conception	of	someone’s	good	to	 imagine	that	 it	might	fail	 in	any	such	way	to	engage	him.”5	However,	there	remain	different	views	about	what	would	suffice	to	avoid	alienness.	My	aim	is	to	 introduce	and	defend	as	viable	a	new	account	of	what	such	constraints	might	look	like.			 Moral	 existence	 internalism	 is	 typically	 formulated	 as	 a	 claim	 about	
motivation.	This	reveals	an	important	sense	in	which	discussions	of	prudential	value	differ	 significantly	 from	 discussions	 of	 moral	 value.	 In	 the	 moral	 case,	 we	 are	typically	 invited	 to	 imagine	 an	 agent	 who	 has	 the	 opportunity	 to	 act	 rightly	 or	wrongly.	The	question	is	whether	the	moral	facts	are	such	that	her	mere	awareness	of	 them	would	 give	 her	 (at	 least	 some,	 perhaps	 defeasible)	 motivation	 to	 do	 the	right	 thing.	 But	 this	 scenario	 is	 prospective.	 Talk	 of	 motivation	makes	 sense	 only	when	 action	 is	 required,	 and	 action	 is	 only	 sometimes	 required	 in	 relation	 to	prudential	value.	Sometimes	we	are	in	pursuit	of	the	good.	But	at	other	times	we	talk	about	 goodness	 that	 is	 realized,	 and	 here	 talk	 of	 motivation	 seems	 out	 of	 place.	When	 we	 talk	 about	 goods	 that	 a	 person	 ‘has’	 or	 ‘possesses’	 we	 need	 different	language.	 Rather	 than	 speak	 of	motivation	we	 speak	 of	 caring	 about	 the	 good	 or	
appreciating	the	good	or	some	other	contemporaneous	positive	response.		 Several	 theorists	 have	 recognized	 that	 when	we	 theorize	 about	 prudential	value	we	need	a	broader	psychological	notion	 than	 just	motivation.6	However,	 this	issue	 of	 terminology	 points	 to	 something	 with	 more	 than	 merely	 terminological	significance.	 It	 points	 to	 a	modal	 distinction	 between	 types	 of	 prudential	 facts—a	distinction	between	goodness	that	is	currently	realized	and	goodness	that	is	merely																																																									5	Railton	(1986a).		6	In	addition	to	Rosati	(1996)	see	Velleman	(2000),	Heathwood	(ms.),	and	Dorsey	(2017).	
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possible;	although	no	one	has	made	much	of	this	modal	distinction,	I	will	do	so	here.	In	what	 follows,	 I	 defend	 the	 idea	 that	prudential	 existence	 internalism	should	be	understood	simply	as	a	constraint	on	facts	about	realized	goodness.	In	those	cases	where	talk	of	motivation	might	make	sense—cases	involving	possible	good—I	argue	that	we	should	be	motivational	externalists.					 In	Section	5.1,	I	first	briefly	describe	what	I	call	“the	structure	of	good.”	The	aim	is	simply	to	make	explicit	the	important	relationships	between	different	kinds	of	goodness	claims.	In	Section	5.2,	I	then	introduce	and	defend	the	coherence	of	my	particular	version	of	internalism.	I	don't	pretend	to	offer	a	direct	argument	for	the	plausibility	of	prudential	existence	internalism	itself.7	Instead,	since	many	theorists	of	 well-being	 accept	 internalism,	 I	 aim	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 coherence	 and	plausibility	 of	 a	particular	way	of	 formulating	 existence	 internalism	 for	 prudential	value.	 In	 Section	5.3,	 I	 examine	 the	most	 influential	 alternative	 formulation	of	 the	internalism	constraint,	Rosati’s	 two-tier	 internalism,	and	argue	 that	my	account	 is	preferable	to	hers.			
§1.		The	Structure	of	Good			 Ordinary	 talk	 about	what	 is	 or	would	 be	 good	 for	 a	 person	 is	 usually	 talk	about	 prudential	 goods.	 We	 seek	 to	 realize	 various	 kinds	 of	 intrinsic	 prudential	goods	 in	our	 lives.	 I	 adopt	 an	understanding	of	 intrinsic	 value	 as	 final	 value,	 such	that	its	natural	opposite	is	instrumental	value.8	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	word	‘intrinsic,’	when	used	to	signal	final	value,	could	also	apply	to	the	kind	of	value	
																																																								7	Some	theorists	do	argue	for	it.	See	Rosati	(1996),	Velleman	(2000)	and	Dorsey	(2017).	Sarch	(2011)	offers	important	criticisms	of	the	arguments	in	Velleman	and	Rosati.	Dorsey	(2017)	argues	that	we	should	not	accept	prudential	existence	internalism	simply	because	we	find	it	highly	intuitive.	There	are,	he	claims,	far	too	many	intuitions	that	pull	in	the	opposite	direction	as	well,	such	that	we	must	have	some	substantive	reason	for	holding	onto	internalism.	I	think	he	overstates	his	point,	however.	Those	 who	 find	 internalism	 compelling	 rarely	 find	 the	 alleged	 counterexamples	 to	 internalism	compelling	as	well.	Rather	this	is	one	of	the	places	in	philosophy	where	(sadly)	intuitions	seem	to	fall	on	different	sides	of	a	seemingly	unbridgeable	divide.			8	See	Korsgaard	(1983)	and	Kagan	(1998).	Intrinsic	value	can	refer	either	to	the	value	something	has	based	only	on	 its	 intrinsic	properties	 (the	contrast	 is	extrinsic	value),	or	 it	 can	refer	 to	 the	kind	of	value	something	has	when	we	value	it	for	itself,	as	a	final	end	(the	contrast	being	instrumental	value).	Kagan	 defends	 the	 coherence	 of	 retaining	 the	 label	 “intrinsic	 value”	 for	 the	 concept	 of	 final	 value,	which	is	the	approach	I	adopt.	For	more	about	the	concept	of	intrinsic	value	see	Zimmerman	(2015).	
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had	by	a	good	life.9	Here,	I	only	use	the	word	for	prudentially	valuable	items	within	a	life.	Furthermore,	I	take	no	stance	here	on	what	kinds	of	things	may	count	as	basic	intrinsic	prudential	goods.	Everything	I	say	can	be	adapted	(sometimes	with	a	little	tweaking	of	my	examples)	to	the	full	range	of	views	about	prudential	goods.			 Basic,	intrinsic,	prudential	goods	are	good	for	us	at	a	specific	time	or	times.10	If	riding	a	bicycle	is	intrinsically	good	for	me,	then,	plausibly,	it	is	good	for	me	while	I	
am	 riding.	 Some	 goods	 are	 temporally	 brief;	 others	 last	 most	 of	 a	 lifetime.	 It	 is	important	 to	 mark	 a	 distinction	 between	 goods	 that	 are	 currently	 realized	 for	 a	person	 (currently	 adding	 value	 to	 her	 life)	 and	 goods	 that	 could	 be	 realized	(depending	 on	 how	 things	 go).	 We	 must	 constantly	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 modal	distinction	between	realized	good	and	possible	good.			 Because	I	maintain	that	prudential	goods	are	the	building	blocks	of	life	value,	my	 view	 is	 unabashedly	 additive.	What	makes	 a	 life	 good	 are	 the	 goods	 in	 it.	 Of	course,	some	theorists	reject	additive	views.11	However,	I	suspect	that	many	people	are	suspicious	of	additive	accounts	because	they	focus	on	rather	simple	versions	of	additivism.			 For	additivists	like	myself,	talk	of	a	good	life	depends	on	the	notion	of	overall	value,	or	net	value.	Importantly,	a	life	can	be	said	to	be	good	in	two	distinct	ways.12	In	one	sense,	a	life	is	good	if	it	has	net	positive	value,	if	the	intrinsic	goods	in	that	life	outweigh	the	intrinsic	bads,	even	if	only	by	a	little.	Something	like	this	seems	to	be	what	(some)	philosophers	have	in	mind	when	they	talk	about	“a	 life	worth	living.”	However,	a	different	sense	of	good	captures	the	sense	in	which	we	all	aspire	to	have	a	good	life.	A	good	life	in	this	sense	is	one	that	satisfies	a	high	threshold.	It	is	a	life																																																									9	This	point	is	made	by	Feldman	(2000).	10	Not	everyone	will	agree	that	goods	must	be	realized	at	determinate	times	(e.g.	Nagel,	1970).	I	argue	for	the	idea	that	prudential	goods	must	be	realized	at	particular	times	in	Hawkins	(2014).		11	A	 certain	 sub-set	 of	 theorists	 reject	 additive	 views	because	 they	 take	 seriously	 the	 idea	 that	 the	shape	of	a	life	matters	prudentially.	They	tend	to	assume	that	this	rules	out	additivity	(or	as	some	say	“intra-life	 aggregation”).	 See	 e.g.	 Slote	 (1984),	 Velleman	 (1991),	 Temkin	 (2012),	 Glasgow	 (2013).	Dorsey	(2015)	demonstrates	that,	depending	on	why	you	think	shape	matters,	taking	shape	seriously	may	 be	 compatible	 with	 aggregation.	 	 I	 am	 more	 willing	 than	 many	 to	 simply	 downplay	 the	importance	of	shape	of	life	considerations.	On	this	see	Hawkins	(2014).	12	I	 find	it	 intuitive	to	distinguish	(as	I	do	in	the	text)	between	a	minimal	sense	of	good	and	a	more	robust,	 aspirational	 sense	 that	 depends	 on	 a	 high	 threshold.	 However,	 sometimes	 the	 two	 are	collapsed.	For	example,	Sidgwick	(1907)	equates	welfare	with	happiness	and	defines	happiness	as	a	“surplus	of	pleasure	over	pain.”		
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that	has	a	fair	amount	of	net	positive	value.	 It	 is	something	to	aim	at.	Lives	like	this	are	“better	than	most.”		 Insofar	as	we	exercise	agency	in	pursuit	of	our	good,	what	concerns	us	most	are	good	choices.	To	understand	choices,	we	must	consider	the	structure	of	possible	future	good.	For	any	given	individual	there	are	many	possible	continuations	of	her	life.	What	 counts	as	 the	best	 continuation	depends	on	what	 the	 set	of	possibilities	are.	 The	 best	 continuation	 is	 the	 one	 with	 the	 greatest	 net	 value.	 However,	 it	 is	important	 to	 remember	 that	 the	 best	 continuation	 of	 a	 life	 (which	 means	 ‘best’	relative	to	 the	options)	may	not	be	good	 in	either	of	 the	senses	sketched	above:	 it	may	not	have	positive	net	value,	and	it	may	not	be	good	in	the	aspirational	sense	of	a	life	“better	than	most.”			 The	best	 choice	 for	an	 individual	at	a	 time	 is	 the	one	 that	moves	her	 in	 the	direction	 of	 realizing	 the	 best	 continuation	 of	 her	 life.	 A	 good	 choice	 is	 one	 that	moves	 her	 towards	 one	 of	 the	 better	 continuations	 in	 the	 set	 of	 possible	continuations.	 In	 ordinary	 speech,	 evaluations	 of	 choices	 and	 outcomes	 often	 get	blurred.	For	example,	we	are	often	reluctant	to	call	a	choice	good	if	the	outcome	it	produces	 is	not	(even	though	 it	 leads	to	 the	 least	worst	outcome).	And	sometimes	we	 call	 a	 choice	 good	 if	 it	 helps	 us	 to	 realize	 something	 good	 immediately,	 even	though	 the	 further	 consequences	 of	 the	 choice	 are	 not	 good.	 In	 what	 follows,	however,	I	stick	to	the	use	of	“good	choice”	defined	here.			 Sometimes	 realizing	 a	 good	 continuation	 of	 a	 life	 requires	 the	 subject	 to	make	dramatic	changes—changes	of	direction	or	goal.	It	may	require	new	skills	or	training.	It	may	even	require	changing	aspects	of	herself.	This	is	important,	because	goodness	 facts	 that	 lie	on	 the	other	 side	of	 great	 change	are	 the	hardest	 for	us	 to	“see.”	 It	 could	 thus	be	 true	of	an	 individual	 that	 the	best	 choice	 for	her	 is	one	she	does	not	recognize	as	good	at	all.	Like	intrinsic	prudential	goods,	choices	have	value	at	a	time.	But	their	value	is	instrumental,	depending	on	how	the	choice	relates	to	the	possibilities	the	subject	confronts.			 	 	
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§2.	Existence	Internalism	and	Prudential	Value			 Let	 us	 now	 consider	 potential	 internalist	 constraints	 on	 goodness	 facts.	Recall	 that	 existence	 internalism	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 there	 is	 a	 necessary	 connection	between,	on	the	one	hand,	normative	facts	(in	this	case	prudential	facts)	and	on	the	other	hand,	human	psychological	responses.	What	might	this	connection	be?			 In	 the	 case	 of	 prudential	 value	 there	 is	 a	 rather	 simple	 suggestion	one	 can	make.	Unsurprisingly,	being	simple	it	has	problems.	However,	these	are	more	easily	dealt	with	than	typically	supposed.	I	shall	consider	and	respond	to	these	problems	along	the	way,	some	in	this	section	and	some	later.	But	for	the	moment,	reflection	on	the	simple	suggestion	is	a	good	way	to	start.			 What	 I	 call	 the	 simple	 suggestion	 is	 best	 brought	 out	 through	 examples.13	Imagine	 a	woman	named	Samia	who	 is	 a	newspaper	writer.	Various	people	 claim	that	being	a	writer	is	intrinsically	good	for	Samia.	They	mean	that	it	is	good	for	her	now,	not	that	it	will	be	good	for	her	at	some	point	in	the	future,	nor	that	it	would	be	good	for	her	if	only	she	were	different	in	some	way.	Because	they	mean	it	is	good	for	her	 now—as	 she	 is—they	 are	 making	 a	 claim	 about	 realized	 intrinsic	 prudential	
goodness.			 As	we	learn	more	about	her	case,	the	facts	cast	doubt	on	their	claim.	First,	we	discover	that	writing	and	the	writing	life	do	not	give	Samia	any	pleasure.14	Next,	we	consider	 whether	 it	 makes	 her	 happy.	 After	 all,	 people	 can	 sometimes	 be	 made	happy	by	activities	or	projects	that	they	would	not	exactly	describe	as	pleasurable.	But	 the	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 Samia	 is	 not	 happy.	 Writing	 leaves	 her	 feeling	depressed	and	drained.	Sometimes	people	pursue	things	they	value	even	though	the	pursuit	 doesn’t	 fit	 their	 affective	 profile	 very	well.	 In	 such	 cases,	 despite	 how	 the	pursuit	 makes	 them	 feel,	 they	 think	 the	 thing	 they	 are	 pursuing	 has	 value.	 It	 is	because	 they	 value	 it	 that	 they	 persevere.	 But	 Samia	 doesn’t	 value	writing	 either.	She	doesn’t	think	it	is	important	in	its	own	right.	In	fact,	she	doesn’t	see	any	value	in	
																																																								13	The	following	example	presupposes	a	non-mental	state	theory	of	welfare	since	the	activity	of	writing	is	being	considered	as	a	candidate	for	intrinsic	goodness.	Nothing	much	turns	on	this	as	I	hope	will	be	clear	by	the	end.	But	a	concrete	example	has	to	make	some	sort	of	assumption	about	welfare.		14	Even	non-hedonists	may	think	that	pleasure	is	a	sign	of	the	presence	of	value.		
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it	at	all.	For	whatever	reason,	it	is	just	the	job	she	has	right	now	and	she	has	to	do	it	to	make	a	living.			 At	this	point	it	becomes	incredibly	hard	to	believe	that	writing	is	intrinsically	good	 for	 Samia.	 This	 suggests	 a	 general	 type	 of	 necessary	 condition	 on	 realized	
intrinsic	goodness.	Call	this	the	simple	constraint	(SC):			SC:		A	necessary	condition	on	something	X	being	a	basic	intrinsic	prudential	good	for	a	subject,	S,	at	a	time	T,	is	that	S	must	have	some	kind	of	positive	response	to	X	at	T.			Here,	 I	 intend	positive	 response	 to	be	 construed	quite	broadly	 to	 include	positive	sensations,	 feelings,	 affective	 states,	 and	 positive	 evaluative	 attitudes.15	However,	positive	 responses	 must	 be	 psychological	 and	 at	 least	 partly	 conscious.	 It	 is	 also	important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 condition	 is	 framed	 as	 necessary,	 but	 it	 says	 nothing	about	the	sufficiency	conditions	for	good.				 One	problem	with	SC	emerges	quickly.	It	has	to	do	with	our	understanding	of	‘response’	and	whether	 it	 is	 flexible	enough	to	cover	cases	of	 temporally	extended	value	and	the	attitudes	that	ground	such	value.	Suppose	(unlike	a	hedonist)	I	think	that	relationships	can	have	intrinsic	prudential	value.	A	relationship	might	last	for	a	long	 time	and	have	value	 for	me	during	all	 of	 that	 time.	But	presumably	 I	 am	not	having	 a	 positive	 response	 to	 this	 relationship	 (or	 the	 person	 I	 am	 related	 to)	 at	each	of	the	times	when	(intuitively)	it	is	good	for	me.	What	seems	likely	is	that	the	relationship	becomes	good	when	I	first	develop	a	certain	attitude	of	valuing	towards	it.	But	this	attitude	will	not	be	at	the	forefront	of	awareness	from	then	on.			 Of	course	there	is	a	sense	in	which,	all	through	that	time,	I	‘have’	the	valuing	attitude.	This	is	a	dispositional	sense.	Most	beliefs	and	evaluative	attitudes	require	a	dispositional	analysis.	For	years	I	have	had	a	belief	about	where	I	was	born.	If	you	ask	me	 if	 I	 was	 born	 there	 I	will	 say	 yes.	 But	 I	 hardly	 ever	 think	 about	 this	 fact,	
																																																								15	My	 intention	 is	 to	 be	 as	 broad	 as	 possible	within	 the	 range	 of	 positively	 valenced	 psychological	reactions.	 Heathwood	 (ms.)	 similarly	 argues	 for	 the	 need	 to	 define	 the	 psychological	 side	 of	 an	internalist	constraint	broadly.	We	thus	differ	from	Dorsey	(2017)	who	defines	the	constraint	in	terms	of	valuing	attitudes.			
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despite	 believing	 it.	 Only	 rarely	 does	 this	 content	 rise	 to	 the	 level	 of	 occurrent	thought.			 Evaluative	attitudes	are	more	complex	than	ordinary	non-evaluative	beliefs.	It	 might	 call	 into	 doubt	 my	 valuing	 of	 X	 if	 I	 rarely	 thought	 about	 X.	 If	 I	 value	 X,	occurrent	positive	thoughts	about	X	must	occur,	at	least	periodically.	Moreover,	if	X	is	something	(or	someone)	 I	 interact	with	regularly,	one	would	expect	me	to	have	various	kinds	of	positive	response	to	X	on	a	regular	basis.	It	was	(at	least	in	part)	the	absence	 of	 such	 regular,	 positive	 responses	 to	 writing	 that	 raised	 doubts	 about	Samia.	 It	 is,	 of	 course,	 entirely	 unclear	 how	many	 responses	 are	 required	 or	 how	often	they	must	occur.	But	 the	details	need	not	concern	us	here	as	 long	as	we	can	agree	 that	 it	 is	 too	strong	 to	 say	 that	positive	 response	must	be	constant,	 and	 too	weak	 to	 require	 that	 positive	 response	 only	 occur	 once.	 I	 suggest	 we	 talk	 about	valuing	 and	 other	 on-going	 positive	 attitudes	 as	 ‘positive	 engagements,’	 in	recognition	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 such	 attitudes,	 though	 dispositional,	 will	 with	 some	regularity	become	manifest	in	occurrent	positive	responses.	Then	we	can	make	the	following	amendment:			SC2:	A	necessary	requirement	on	X’s	being	a	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	good	for	S	at	T	is	that	S	must	either	have	a	positive	response	to	X	at	T,	or	S	must	have	an	on-going	positive	engagement	with	X	that	still	holds	at	T.			 			 However,	a	second	problem	follows	quickly	in	the	wake	of	the	first.	For	SC2	seems	 to	 require	 that	 all	 good	 things	 enter	 the	 awareness	 of	 a	 subject.	 Most	contemporary	theorists	of	welfare	reject	what	James	Griffin	labeled	“the	experience	requirement,”	 the	 idea	 that	 prudential	 goodness	 (or	 badness)	 must	 enter	 our	experience	 or	 our	 awareness.16	They	 insist	 that	 intrinsic	 prudential	 value	 can	 be	realized	 even	 when	 the	 subject	 is	 ignorant	 of	 this.	 The	 most	 straightforward	example	 of	 theories	 that	 allow	 this	 are	 traditional	 versions	 of	 desire	 fulfillment	
																																																								16	Griffin	(1986).	
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theory	that	allow	that	the	satisfaction	of	a	desire	(an	event	in	the	world)	is	good	for	a	person	even	if	she	doesn’t	ever	know	it	has	been	satisfied.			 This	is	a	problem;	however,	it	is	important	to	keep	certain	goals	in	mind.	The	aim	is	to	articulate	a	very	general	internalism	requirement	that	focuses	on	realized	
intrinsic	prudential	good.	Any	candidate	must	minimally	explain	our	intuitions	about	cases	like	Samia.	But	we	can	accomplish	these	dual	goals	without	at	the	same	time	building	in	an	experience	requirement.	We	just	change	SC2	to	SC3:		SC3:	A	necessary	condition	on	something,	X,	being	a	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	good	for	a	subject,	S,	at	a	time	T,	is	that:		(1) If	S	is	aware	of	X	at	T,	S	must	either	have	a	positive	response	to	X	at	T,	or	S	must	have	an	on-going	positive	engagement	with	X	that	still	holds	at	T,	or		(2) If	 S	 is	 unaware	of	X	 at	T,	 it	must	be	 true	 that	 S	would	have	had	 a	positive	response	to	X	at	T	if	she	had	been	aware	of	X	at	T.		This	formulation	leaves	room	for	the	possibility	that	something,	X,	might	be	good	for	S	at	T,	even	though	S	does	not	respond	positively	to	it	then	because	S	knows	nothing	
about	it.	It	holds	onto	the	idea	(which	seems	key)	that	a	certain	kind	of	psychological	relation	 must	 obtain	 between	 S	 and	 X	 at	 the	 very	 time	 X	 is	 good	 for	 S.	 What	 is	relinquished	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 relation	must	 involve	 a	 direct	 experience	 of	 the	good	thing.	The	right	kind	of	psychological	relations	can	obtain	at	a	time	as	long	as	certain	 psychological	 dispositions	 for	 response	 obtain	 at	 that	 time.17	It	 is	 also	important	 that	 the	 counterfactual	 element	 here	 is	minimal.	 No	 appeal	 is	made	 to	how	S	would	 respond	 to	 X	 in	 conditions	 extremely	 different	 from	 the	 ones	 she	 is	currently	 in.	The	counterfactual	appeals	to	a	situation	exactly	 like	the	real	one	but	for	one	difference:	S’s	awareness	of	X.	Finally,	such	an	account	can	still	easily	handle	the	more	ordinary	cases	 in	which	someone	 is	 aware	of	a	putative	good.	Writing	 is	
																																																								17	The	current	framing	of	the	constraint	assumes	that	the	intrinsically	good	thing	must	be	the	object	of	a	psychological	response.	As	will	become	clear	in	later	discussion,	I	also	allow	that	a	theorist	could	modify	 SC	 slightly	 to	 include	 cases	 in	which	 the	psychological	 response	 is	 itself	 the	 intrinsic	 good.	Heathwood	(ms.)	also	discusses	this.	
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not	 good	 for	 Samia,	 since	 Samia	 clearly	 is	 aware	 of	 writing	 yet	 has	 no	 positive	responses	to	it	and	no	ongoing	positive	engagement	with	it.			 Some	 theorists	 may	 still	 find	 SC3	 problematic.	 Even	 though	 there	 is	 no	requirement	 in	SC3	 that	S	actually	 respond	positively	 to	X,	 there	 is	a	 requirement	that	 S	 have	 certain	 response	dispositions	 toward	 X	 at	 T.	 Some	 theorists	 think	 that	once	you	give	up	the	experience	requirement	there	is	no	reason	to	place	restrictions	on	 the	 subject’s	 psychology	 at	 the	 time	 when	 goodness	 is	 realized.18	But	 this	 is	mistaken.	Without	some	such	requirement	it	is	far	too	easy	to	generate	bizarre	cases	in	which	 a	 person	 is	 benefited	 at	 a	 time	 by	 something	 she	would	 (if	 she	 actually	knew	about	it)	view	as	deeply	bad.	The	constraint	we	are	articulating	requires	(as	a	necessary	 condition	only)	a	kind	of	 fit	between	current	psychological	outlook	and	goodness	facts.	No	doubt	different	theorists	will	be	tempted	to	explain	in	different	ways	why	such	fit	is	important.	But	whatever	explanation	one	gives,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	 it	will	 not	 apply	 just	 as	well	 in	 the	 case	where	 the	 subject	 is	 ignorant	 of	 the	putative	good.			 In	what	 follows,	 I	shall	continue	to	use	the	phrase	“simple	constraint”	but	 I	will	now	take	it	to	refer	to	SC3.		
§2.1		Internalism	and	Theories	of	Welfare			 In	addition	to	whatever	surface	plausibility	the	simple	constraint	has,	it	gains	some	 indirect	 support	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 theorists	 of	 welfare,	 particularly	those	 of	 a	 subjectivist	 bent,	 seem	 to	 be—at	 least	 implicitly—concerned	 with	preserving	something	like	it.			
§2.1.1		Hedonism			 Consider	 first	 classical	 hedonism	 according	 to	 which	 pleasure	 is	 the	 only	basic	 intrinsic	 good	 and	 pain	 the	 only	 basic	 intrinsic	 bad.	 One	 natural	 way	 of	understanding	the	allure	of	hedonism	is	to	note	that	pleasure	is	a	mental	state	that	is,	 when	 experienced,	 always	 welcomed,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 degree,	 by	 the	 person																																																									18	Derek	Parfit	(1984:	495)	seems	to	suggest	this.	
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whose	pleasure	it	is.	It	is,	of	course,	possible	to	have	mixed	reactions	to	pleasure.	I	might	feel	pleasure,	but	because	I	think	my	feeling	pleasure	is	inappropriate,	I	might	also	feel	shame,	or	embarrassment.	In	short,	I	can	both	feel	pleasure	at	a	time	(and	when	 feeling	 it	welcome	 it)	 and	 yet	 at	 a	 different,	 higher	 level	 of	my	 psychology,	adopt	 a	 disapproving	 attitude	 towards	my	 own	 pleasure	 and	 so	 desire	 not	 to	 be	experiencing	it.			 I	 suggest	we	 think	 of	 this	 ‘welcoming’	 response	 as	 an	 involuntary	 affective	response,	one	that	operates	at	a	different	level	from	more	cognitively	sophisticated	attitudes.	It	is	this	immediate,	low-level	reaction	to	pleasure—what	I	am	calling	the	welcoming	 response—that	 seems	 to	 underwrite	 our	 sense	 that	 experiences	 of	pleasure	 satisfy	 SC3.	Moreover,	 the	welcoming	 response	 is	 something	we	 reliably	have	whenever	we	experience	pleasure,	and	it	lasts	only	for	as	long	as	the	pleasure	lasts.	 Thus	 pleasure	 naturally	 and	 easily	 satisfies	 the	 simple	 constraint:	 for	 the	hedonist,	pleasure	is	good	whenever	S	experiences	it,	and	whenever	S	experiences	it,	S	has	a	positive	(welcoming)	response	to	it	at	that	time.			 Someone	 might	 object	 that	 whether	 or	 not	 pleasure	 satisfies	 the	 simple	constraint	depends	on	the	nature	of	pleasure.19		There	is	something	to	this.	To	see	why,	 consider	 two	 views—distinguished	 by	 L.W.	 Sumner—about	 the	 nature	 of	pleasure.20	On	 internalist	 views,	 pleasure	 is	 simply	 a	 particular	 type	 of	 sensation.	What	various	pleasures	have	in	common	is	“their	positive	feeling	tone:	an	intrinsic,	unanalyzable	quality	of	pleasantness	that	is	present	to	a	greater	or	lesser	degree	in	all	of	them.”21	Externalist	views,	on	the	other	hand,	define	pleasure	in	terms	of	some	attitude	or	response	that	an	agent	has	towards	a	sensation.	The	various	sensations	might	 be	 quite	 diverse,	 but	 what	 makes	 them	 pleasures	 is	 the	 subject’s	 attitude	towards	them.22	I	find	it	helpful	to	think	of	such	theories	as	bundle	theories,	because																																																									19	Guy	 Fletcher	 raised	 this	 objection	 when	 this	 paper	 was	 presented	 at	 the	 2014	 Metaethics	Conference.	 Namely,	 he	 pointed	 out	 that	 hedonism	 plus	 an	 externalist	 account	 of	 pleasure	 would	violate	SC3.	He	has	also	made	a	similar	point	in	Fletcher	(2013).			20	L.	W.	Sumner	(1996).	It	is	unfortunate	that	so	many	different	debates	in	philosophy	are	framed	in	terms	of	the	labels	internalism/	externalism.	Here	the	terms	are	currently	being	used	in	the	service	of	a	debate	about	the	nature	of	pleasure—a	debate	entirely	unrelated	to	the	metaethical	debate	that	is	the	main	focus	of	the	paper.			21	Ibid,	88.		22	Heathwood	(2007)	is	a	contemporary	defense	of	an	externalist	view	of	pleasure.	
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on	 such	 views	 pleasure	 is	 a	 bundle	with	 two	 elements:	 a	 sensation	and	 a	 certain	kind	of	positive	response	to	that	sensation.			 Both	 internalists	 and	 externalists	 typically	 acknowledge	 the	 existence	 of	positive	response	in	cases	of	pleasure.	They	differ	merely	in	whether	they	view	that	response	as	a	reaction	to	pleasure,	or	as	a	part	of	pleasure.			 For	internalists	the	welcoming	response	is	a	response	to	a	sensation,	and	the	sensation	is	pleasure.	Since	the	response	is	a	response	to	pleasure	and	it	is	pleasure	that	 is	 claimed	 to	 be	 good,	 this	 neatly	 satisfies	 the	 simple	 constraint.	 But	 for	externalists	the	welcoming	response	is	a	part	of	pleasure.	If	you	combine	this	view	with	the	claim	that	pleasure	is	good,	the	view	in	question	will	not	satisfy	the	simple	constraint.	The	simple	constraint	claims	that	something	can	only	be	good	when	the	subject	has	a	positive	response	to	it,	and	that	would	require	a	welcoming	response	(or	some	other	positive	response)	to	the	bundle	that	already	contains	a	welcoming	response.	 In	short,	 if	we	accept	 the	simple	constraint,	 then	 in	order	 for	externalist	pleasure	 to	count	as	good	 it	would	have	to	be	 true	 that	we	routinely	welcome	the	thing	that	contains	welcoming.	This	is	implausible.			 How	problematic	is	this?	First,	it	is	important	to	note	that	it	doesn’t	threaten	my	central	claim	which	is	this:	at	least	part	of	the	attraction	of	hedonism	historically	has	come	 from	the	 fact	 that	 theorists	 intuitively	wanted	to	capture	something	 like	the	simple	constraint	and	thought	that	equating	goodness	facts	with	pleasure	was	a	way	 to	 do	 this.	 Even	 if	 externalist	 theories	 are	 currently	 more	 popular	 with	philosophers,	 historically	 many	 hedonists	 were	 internalists	 and	 others	 appear	 to	have	been	confused	or	undecided	about	which	view	to	accept.23	Moreover,	I	suspect	internalism	about	pleasure	is	the	naïve	view,	in	the	sense	that	it	is	the	one	most	of	us	 begin	 with.	 But	 then,	 since	 internalism	 about	 pleasure	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	simple	 constraint,	 my	 claim	 about	 the	 historical	 allure	 of	 hedonism	 may	 still	 be	correct.			 Second,	the	problems	here	may	be	pretty	minor.	Clearly	it	 is	the	welcoming	response	(whether	thought	of	as	part	of	pleasure	or	as	a	reaction	to	pleasure)	that																																																									23	For	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 different	 strands	 of	 thought	 running	 through	 the	 tradition	 see	 Sumner	(1996:	87-91).	
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underwrites	many	people’s	sense	that	pleasure	is	good	for	the	one	who	experiences	it	 (whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	 an	 all-things-considered	 good	 is	 a	 different	matter).	 Given	that	 this	 is	 so,	 an	externalist	 about	pleasure	 could	make	several	moves.	 She	 could	modify	 the	 simple	 constraint	 slightly.	 For	 example,	 a	 hedonist	 who	 is	 externalist	about	pleasure	could	adopt	SC4,	which,	in	spirit,	is	not	so	different	from	the	earlier	versions	of	SC:				SC4:	 A	 necessary	 condition	 of	 X’s	 being	 a	 basic,	 intrinsic	 prudential	 good	 for	 a	subject,	S,	 at	T	 is	 that	X	be	 the	kind	of	mental	 state	 that	has	a	positive	welcoming	response	built	into	it.24			Alternatively,	 the	externalist	could	simply	say	that	we	misspeak	when	we	say	that	pleasure	is	what	has	intrinsic	value.	Rather	it	is	the	central	element	of	pleasure—the	sensation	 at	 its	 core—that	 has	 value,	 and	 it	 has	 this	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	we	naturally	 welcome	 it.	 Finally,	 one	 might	 simply	 adopt	 an	 internalist	 account	 of	pleasure.	After	all,	it	does	seem	much	more	natural	to	say	that	we	welcome	pleasure	(as	opposed	to	saying	that	pleasure	is	partly	a	welcoming).25			 Though	I	do	not	have	space	to	consider	other	theories	besides	hedonism	that	focus	on	occurrent	attitudes	or	experiences,	it	should	be	obvious	that	many	of	them	will	also	have	the	resources	to	satisfy	SC3.			
§2.1.2		Desire	Fulfillment	Theories			 Although	desire	 theories	 are	different	 from	hedonism,	desire	 theorists	 also	seem	to	be	concerned	with	something	like	the	simple	constraint.26	The	evidence	for																																																									24	A	 value	 pluralist	 who	 counts	 pleasure	 as	 one	 value	 among	 others	 could	 combine	 SC4	 with	 the	earlier	SC3	to	get	a	hybrid	principle.		25	For	recent,	more	sophisticated	internalist	views	of	pleasure	see	Crisp	(2006),	Smuts	(2011).		26	It	 is	sometimes	said	that	one	of	the	most	 intuitive	features	of	desire	theories	 is	that	they	(better	than	 other	 theories)	 capture	 the	 internalist	 constraint.	 See	 e.g.	 Arneson	 (1999),	 Noggins	 (1999),	Brink	(2008),	Dorsey	(2017).	However,	what	is	meant	is	not	that	desire	theories	preserve	something	like	 the	constraint	 I	defend	here.	Rather	 such	comments	presuppose	an	entirely	different	vision	of	what	prudential	internalism	amounts	to,	a	vision	I	think	we	should	reject	(see	my	arguments	against	Rosati	below).	Although	the	features	of	desire	theory	commonly	thought	to	preserve	internalism	are	not	my	 focus,	 I	 think	one	can	 trace	 in	 the	development	of	desire	 theory	an	 implicit	commitment	 to	
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this	 is	 indirect,	but	nonetheless	powerful.	Without	 trying	 to	name	all	 the	different	desire	theories	or	go	into	their	details,	we	can	point	to	a	particular	direction	that	the	development	of	such	views	has	taken	over	time,	one	that	is	suggestive	of	concerns	about	positive	response	to	realized	basic	intrinsic	good.			 The	most	basic	form	of	desire	theory	claims	that	what	is	good	for	a	person	is	for	her	actual	desires	to	be	satisfied.	It	is	the	desire	satisfaction—a	state	of	affairs	in	the	world—that	 is	 the	bearer	of	 intrinsic	value.	The	mental	state	 ‘desire’	 is	simply	relevant	as	the	device	that	tells	us	which	states	of	affairs	benefit	which	people.	Only	those	states	of	affairs	that	are	the	satisfaction	of	my	desires	benefit	me.			 What	matters	for	our	purposes	is	the	way	these	views	have	developed	over	time.	Most	theorists	take	‘desire’	to	be	a	prospective	attitude.27	I	desire	now	what	I	shall	(perhaps)	get	 later.	 It	 is	this	 feature	of	desire	that	creates	problems	for	basic	desire	 theories.	 It	 is	 usually	 assumed	 that	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 a	 desire	 benefits	 a	person	at	the	time	the	desire	is	satisfied.	However,	a	person	might	desire	X	at	T,	but	when	her	desire	 is	 satisfied	at	T2	and	 she	 is	 aware	of	 this,	 it	might	be	 that	 she	 is	disappointed	in	X.	The	problem	isn’t	just	that	she	is	unhappy.	Desire	theorists	pride	themselves	 on	 being	 able	 to	 accommodate	 the	 fact	 that	 not	 everyone	 cares	 about	happiness.	Some	individuals	do	quite	well	in	life	despite	having	little	happiness.	The	issue	 is	not	happiness	per	se,	but	rather	 lack	of	any	kind	of	positive	response	 to	 the	putative	good.	Not	only	does	 it	not	make	her	happy	or	give	her	pleasure,	but	now	that	she	‘has’	it	she	sees	no	value	in	it.			 This	 is	 just	 the	 same	 point	 made	 earlier:	 if	 something	 is	 supposedly	intrinsically	good	for	a	person	at	a	time	(and	she	is	aware	of	this	thing)	we	expect	there	to	be	some	kind	of	positive	response	to	the	good	thing	at	that	time.	Theorists	
																																																																																																																																																																					something	 like	 my	 constraint.	 So	 far	 as	 I	 know,	 such	 a	 commitment	 has	 never	 been	 explicitly	articulated	by	desire	theorists	or	labeled	by	them	as	internalism.	But	that	the	commitment	is	there	at	all	strikes	me	as	highly	significant	and	telling.		27	Sumner	 (1996),	 p129.	 Heathwood	 (2006)	 bucks	 this	 trend,	 using	 ‘desire’	 to	 name	 a	 concurrent	attitude,	a	pro-attitude	towards	something	at	the	time	you	have	it.	He	thereby	becomes	immune	to	the	particular	problem	 for	desire	 theories	outlined	here.	However,	 it	 is	doubtful	 that	his	 theory	 (a	species	of	what	Parfit	(1984)	called	“preference	hedonism”)	would	be	classified	as	a	form	of	desire	theory.	Most	simple	desire	theories	do	face	the	problem.	
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can	 differ	 about	 the	 type	 of	 response	 that	 matters,	 but	 if	 there	 is	 no	 positive	response	at	all	we	cannot	sustain	the	thought	that	the	thing	really	is	good.			 Because	 there	 are	 so	many	ways	 that	 prospective	 desires	 can	 be	 defective	and	 thus	so	many	ways	 that	 the	satisfaction	of	prospective	desires	can	disappoint	us,	 simple	 desire	 theories	 have	 very	 few	 advocates.	 However,	 it	 is	 precisely	 the	recognition	of	this	problem	as	a	problem	that	I	want	to	highlight,	because	theorists	with	otherwise	quite	diverse	approaches	have	shared	this	intuition.	Desire	theorists	
themselves	have	tried	to	adjust	their	view	to	avoid	this	problem,	which	suggests	they	accept	 that	 the	 counter-examples	 point	 to	 a	 real	 issue.	 This	 reflects	 an	 implicit	acceptance	of	the	simple	constraint.			 In	 response,	 desire	 theorists	 have	moved	 to	 some	 type	 of	 informed	 desire	theory.	 Some	 of	 these	 views	 are	 like	 the	 simple	 version	 in	 holding	 that	 the	satisfaction	 of	 informed	 desires	 is	 of	 intrinsic	 value.	 But	 others	 depart	 from	 this	somewhat.	Although	still	called	desire	 theories,	here	the	 idea	 is	 that	under	certain	improved	 epistemic	 conditions	 a	 person	 would	 be	 able	 to	 act	 as	 her	 own	 best	advisor.28	From	 the	better	 vantage	point	 she	would	be	able	 to	 ‘see’	 the	prudential	goodness	 facts,	 facts	 about	 goods	 but	 also	 facts	 about	 choices	 and	 lives.	 The	individual’s	 good	 is	 defined	 as	 what	 from	 this	 special	 epistemically	 advantaged	position	 she	would	want	 for	 her	 actual	 self	 if	 she	were	 to	 contemplate	 her	 actual	self’s	 position	 as	 someone	 about	 to	 assume	 her	 actual	 self’s	 position. 29 	The	advantaged	 self	 might	 want	 particular	 intrinsic	 goods	 for	 her	 actual	 self,	 but	 she	might	also	want	her	actual	self	to	make	certain	choices	that	will	lead	(perhaps	only	in	the	long-run)	to	intrinsic	goods.			 The	 problem	 with	 all	 such	 accounts	 is	 that	 it	 still	 seems	 possible	 that	someone	might	get	 the	 thing	her	 informed	self	wants	 for	her	and	yet	not	 find	any	value	in	it.	Alternatively,	she	might	make	the	choice	that	her	informed	self	wants	her	to	make	and	persevere	in	this	direction,	yet	never	come	to	respond	positively	to	or	see	 value	 in	 the	 things	 she	 thereby	 acquires.	 In	 the	 simpler	 case	 we	 find	 it	implausible	 to	 suppose	 that	 a	 thing	 could	 be	 intrinsically	 good	 at	 a	 time	when	 a																																																									28	Railton	(1986a;	1986b).		29	Railton	(1986b:	174).		
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person	(who	is	aware	of	it)	sees	no	good	in	it.	In	the	slightly	more	complex	case,	we	find	it	impossible	to	believe	that	a	choice	is	good,	unless	we	are	confident	that	it	will	at	least	eventually	lead	to	encounters	with	things	we	respond	positively	to.	But	when	we	have	 no	 confidence	 that	 continued	pursuit	 of	 a	 particular	 path	will	 eventually	lead	to	positive	response	of	some	form,	we	find	it	impossible	to	view	the	case	as	one	where	 an	 individual	 is	 proceeding	 down	 a	 path	 towards	 something	 good	 for	 her.	Even	 when	 the	 ideal	 epistemic	 conditions	 are	 described	 as	 incorporating	 full	information	 and	 full	 rationality,	 philosophers	 continue	 to	 have	 doubts	 about	whether	 such	 cases	 (cases	 in	 which	 the	 actual	 self	 finds	 no	 value	 in	 the	 things	selected	for	her	by	the	ideal	self)	will	be	eliminated.30	In	other	words,	the	difference	that	remains	between	theorists	who	accept	full	 information	accounts	of	prudential	good	and	theorists	who	don’t	does	not	appear	to	be	a	disagreement	about	whether	a	theory	should	satisfy	SC3	but	instead	looks	like	a	disagreement	about	whether	that	particular	theory	in	fact	satisfies	SC3.	Both	parties	seem	committed	to	the	idea	that	the	theory	would	fail	if	it	failed	to	satisfy	the	simple	constraint.			
§2.1.3		Objective	List	Theories			 Objective	 list	 theories	 are	 traditionally	 thought	 of	 as	 those	 theories	 that	reject	the	necessity	of	any	kind	of	psychological	response.	Although	this	means	that	most	of	them	fail	to	satisfy	SC3,	this	is	hardly	damning	since	most	of	them	explicitly	reject	any	form	of	existence	internalism.	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	a	number	of	theorists	have	recently	tried	to	amend	this	very	feature	of	objective	list	theories,	recognizing	 it	 as	 the	most	 problematic	 part	 of	 the	 view.	 As	 Shelly	 Kagan	 puts	 it,	“Friends	of	an	objective	account	of	well-being	seem	forced	to	accept	the	unappealing	claim	 that	 I	 could	 be	 extremely	 well-off,	 provided	 that	 I	 have	 the	 right	 objective	goods	in	my	life,	even	though	these	things	hold	no	appeal	for	me,	and	I	am,	in	fact,	utterly	miserable.”31	It	 is	precisely	 the	un-attractiveness	of	 such	a	 claim	 that	 leads	Kagan	 (as	 well	 as	 a	 number	 of	 other	 theorists	 interested	 in	 objective	 views)32	to																																																									30	Sobel	(1994),	Rosati	(1995).		31	Kagan	(2009:	254).	32	For	example,	Adams	(1999);	Darwall	(2002).		
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consider	 a	 modified	 version	 according	 to	 which	 objective	 goods	 can	 improve	 a	person’s	life	only	if	he	or	she	has	positive	attitudes	towards	them.	On	Kagan’s	view	a	person	must	enjoy	the	objective	goods.	Of	course	it	is	not	at	all	clear	whether	these	theorists	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 distinguish	 between	 realized	 good	 and	 merely	potential	good	and	so	not	clear	whether	they	would	embrace	the	simple	constraint.	But	the	quote	from	Kagan	certainly	does	seem	to	suggest	the	simple	constraint.	For	it	 emphasizes	 the	 extreme	 implausibility	 of	 “having”	 or	 “possessing”	 an	 intrinsic	good	at	the	very	time	it	makes	you	miserable.			
§2.2		Further	Objections			 Despite	its	initial	plausibility,	many	theorists	continue	to	worry	about	certain	putative	 counter-examples	 to	 SC3.	 These	 challenge	 the	 necessity	 of	 positive	response	(or	positive	engagement)	in	cases	where	the	subject	clearly	has	knowledge	or	awareness	of	the	putative	intrinsic	good.				 A	 common	 case	 is	 one	where	 a	 person	 is	 in	 the	 process	 of	 acquiring	 some	new	skill	or	transitioning	into	some	new	set	of	circumstances.	For	example,	consider	Maria	who,	 unlike	 Samia,	 has	 the	 talent	 to	 become	 an	 excellent	writer	 and	would	thrive	as	one	if	she	could	just	get	through	the	excruciating	first	years.	Surely	(says	the	objector)	it	is	good	for	Maria	to	keep	going	despite	the	fact	that	currently	she	has	no	positive	response?	Yes.	However,	the	sense	in	which	it	is	good	for	her	to	do	this	is	instrumental.	It	is	a	good	choice	to	persevere	because	genuine	intrinsic	goods	lie	in	wait	for	her	if	she	sticks	with	it	and	acquires	the	skill.			 A	different	case	raises	more	serious	concerns.	Consider	someone	in	a	severe	clinical	 depression.	He	 is	 so	depressed	he	does	not	 currently	have	 the	 capacity	 to	respond	 positively	 to	 anything.	 He	 feels	 no	 pleasure.	 He	 is	 not	 happy.	 He	 values	nothing.	 His	 family	 is	 loving	 and	 supportive	 and	 is	 trying	 to	 get	 him	 into	 a	 good	treatment	 program.	 Surely	 (says	 the	 objector)	 it	 is	 good	 for	 him	 to	 go	 into	treatment?	 Surely	 the	 love	 and	 support	 of	 his	 family	 are	 good	 for	 him	 even	 now,	while	he	cannot	appreciate	their	efforts?	The	simple	constraint	seems	to	imply	that	nothing	 is	 intrinsically	good	 for	 this	person	right	now.	But	 (so	 the	objection	goes)	that	can’t	be	right.		
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	 First,	it	is	important	to	notice	that	the	case	goes	beyond	clinical	reality	(and	so	may	 never	 actually	 be	 instantiated).	 People	 who	 are	 severely	 depressed	 often	cannot	 feel	much	pleasure.	And	they	often	value	 far	less	 than	they	did	beforehand.	But	it	is	not	clear	that	there	really	are	people	who	remain	self-aware	and	yet	have	no	capacity	to	respond	positively	to	anything	at	all.			 Yet	 there	 are	 people	 whose	 capacities	 for	 positive	 response	 are	 severely	limited.	 So	 the	question	 remains,	what	 is	 good	 for	 them?	The	 answer	depends	on	thinking	 about	 the	 structure	 of	 good.	 Certain	 kinds	 of	 claims	 involving	 ‘good’	 are	true	of	this	individual.			 If	the	person	is	treatable,	then	there	exist	possible	continuations	of	her	life	in	which	 she	 could	 realize	 many	 basic,	 intrinsic	 prudential	 goods	 that	 she	 cannot	realize	now.	Assuming	that	some	of	 these	possible	 life	continuations	are	ones	 that	contain	net	positive	 intrinsic	value,	 she	has	a	normative	prudential	 reason	now	to	try	and	bring	about	one	of	 these.	Whether	or	not	 she	 realizes	 it,	 she	has	a	 reason	now	to	try	and	end	her	depression.	Mostly	likely	she	doesn’t	realize	it.	But	it	is	also	true	 that	 those	who	 love	 her	 have	 reason	 now	 to	 help	 her	 out	 of	 depression	 and	should	do	so	precisely	because	she	can’t	appreciate	her	own	situation.		My	account	does	say	that	very	few	things	count	as	basic	intrinsic	prudential	goods	for	her	at	this	
point	in	time.	But	this	seems	right.	Indeed,	it	is	part	of	the	explanation	of	the	badness	of	depression	that	it	narrows	our	evaluative	connections	to	the	world	in	this	way.	It	undermines	us	as	valuers	and	as	responders.			 Some	people,	however,	are	still	not	satisfied.	Surely,	they	argue,	the	love	and	support	of	the	family	is	intrinsically	good	now?	It	is	not	clear	to	me	why	we	should	want	to	say	this.	If	she	currently	has	no	ability	to	respond	positively	to	support	and	cannot	 maintain	 positive	 engagement	 with	 those	 who	 love	 her,	 it	 seems	 that	currently	 the	 love	and	support	 is	quite	 literally	not	benefiting	her.	And	because	of	this,	 it	 fails	 to	be	 intrinsically	 good	 for	her	now.	 This	 is	 compatible	with	 the	 claim	that	there	are	strong	reasons	now	for	providing	love	and	support.	It	may	lead	to	the	individual	getting	the	right	help.	The	love	and	support	may	also	be	good	in	the	sense	that	it	is	good	to	keep	trying	to	engage	someone	who	is	depressed.	You	never	know	when	 your	 expressions	 of	 love	might	 “get	 through.”	 Finally,	 some	 theorists	might	
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wish	 to	 say	 that	 loving	 another	 person	 is	 a	 (morally)	 good	 thing	 for	 the	 one	who	loves	or	that	it	 is	 just	non-relationally	good—good	simpliciter—that	there	be	more	love	in	the	world.	All	of	this	is	compatible	with	recognizing	that	the	love	and	support	is	not	intrinsically	good	for	the	depressed	person	while	she	is	so	deeply	depressed.			 		
§3		Motivation	to	Pursue	the	Good?		 So	far	I	have	focused	entirely	on	one	type	of	constraint,	a	constraint	on	truths	about	realized	good	of	the	form:			 “X	is	a	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	good	for	S	now.”		But	what	about	potential	good?	What	about	truths	of	the	form:				 “Y	would	be	good	for	S”		?			Should	such	truths	motivate	agents	in	the	way	that	some	philosophers	think	moral	truths	should	motivate	individuals	to	act	rightly?			 We	 need	 several	 clarifications	 before	 we	 can	 answer.	 To	 begin	 with,	 the	sentence	 “Y	 would	 be	 good	 for	 S”	 is	 ambiguous.	 ‘Y’	 could	 refer	 to	 some	 putative	intrinsic	good	or	to	a	choice.	Moreover,	it	could	be	true	that	something—perhaps	a	particular	 relationship—would	 be	 intrinsically	 good	 for	 a	 subject	 S,	 but	 still	 false	that	she	ought	to	pursue	it.	For	it	might	also	be	true	that	the	relationship	(which	is	a	good)	 is	 part	 of	 a	 path	 through	 life	 that	 is	 not	 as	 good	 overall.	 Even	 if	 the	relationship	is	intrinsically	good,	if	it	is	not	part	of	one	of	the	good	continuations	of	S’s	life,	then	it	 is	not	a	good	choice.	So	if	we	want	to	consider	issues	of	motivation,	we	 should	 focus	on	 true	 claims	about	 good	 choices.	 If	 any	prudential	 facts	 should	motivate	individuals	to	act,	surely	it	would	be	these.				 Are	all	subjects	such	that	if	they	are	minimally	rational	and	confronted	with	such	facts	they	will	be	(at	least	somewhat)	motivated?	The	right	answer,	I	think,	is:	
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no. 33 		 When	 it	 comes	 to	 merely	 potential	 good,	 we	 should	 be	 motivational	externalists.	To	see	why,	we	first	need	some	clarity	about	what	 is	at	stake.	We	are	interested	 in	 existence	 internalism,	 which	 is	 a	metaphysical	 thesis.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	confuse	 intuitions	 in	 this	 realm	 with	 intuitions	 about	 judgment	 internalism.	Judgment	 internalism	 holds	 that	 there	 is	 a	 necessary	 connection	 between	 sincere	judgment	 involving	 evaluative	 concepts	 and	motivation.	 For	 all	 I	 know,	 judgment	internalism	may	be	true	for	prudential	good.	Perhaps	the	notion	of	prudential	good	is	such	that	if	you	genuinely	believe	Y	is	the	best	choice	for	you,	you	will	necessarily	have	 some	 motivation	 to	 choose	 Y.	 	 I	 take	 no	 stand	 on	 that.	 But	 notice	 that	 if	judgment	 internalism	is	true,	people	will	be	motivated	by	anything	they	believe	to	be	good,	whether	or	not	it	really	is	good.			 Existence	 internalism,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 relation	between	 normative	 facts	 naturalistically	 construed,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 human	responsiveness.	on	the	other.	Theorists	who	want	to	capture	some	form	of	existence	internalism	tend	to	equate	prudential	value	facts	with	facts	they	think	most	people	care	about.	Most	people	care	about	their	happiness,	even	if	that	is	not	all	they	care	about.	 Because	 of	 this	 some	 theorists	 have	 hoped	 to	 secure	 the	 right	 kind	 of	internalist	 connection	 by	 equating	 prudential	 value	 facts	 with	 facts	 about	 what	would	make	someone	happy.	Indeed,	the	constraint	would	work	if	we	could	be	sure	that	 everyone	 is	 always,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 degree,	 motivated	 by	 facts	 about	 what	would	 make	 them	 happy.	 But	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case.	 Nor	 am	 I	 aware	 of	 any	 other	candidate	 set	 of	 goodness	 facts	 that	 people	 are	 reliably	 motivated	 to	 pursue,	independently	of	their	evaluative	beliefs	about	prudential	good.			 In	 short,	 to	 test	 existence	 internalism	we	have	 to	 imagine	 a	 subject	who	 is	considering	a	choice	that,	according	to	our	favored	theory,	is	good	for	her.	She	need	not	think	of	the	choice	or	its	outcome	as	good,	but	she	must	have	correct	descriptive	beliefs	about	what	her	life	would	have	in	it	if	she	made	the	choice	and	what	her	life																																																									33	Many	 theorists	 incline	 towards	 ‘yes.’	 Rosati	 (1996)	 defends	 an	 indirect	 form	 of	 motivational	internalism.	Tiberius	and	Hall	 (2016)	assume	 the	 truth	of	motivational	 internalism,	and	argue	 that	one	 point	 in	 favor	 of	 subject-dependent	 theories	 is	 that	 they	 are	well	 placed	 to	 explain	 this	 truth.	However,	 it	 should	 now	 be	 clear	 that	 not	 all	 subject-dependent	 theories	 actually	 preserve	motivational	internalism	about	potential	good.				
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would	be	like	for	her	at	various	points	in	the	future	if	she	made	it.	The	question	is	whether	 we	 can	 identify	 any	 plausible	 potential	 goodness	 facts	 that	 we	 can	 be	certain	she	will	motivated	by.	There	is	no	reason	to	think	that	we	can.			 If	 I	am	right,	 then	we	should	be	motivational	externalists	when	 it	 comes	 to	
unrealized,	merely	potential	good.	Of	course,	even	externalists	can	allow	that	people	are	 sometimes	motivated	 by	 such	 facts.	What	 they	 deny	 is	 that	 such	motivational	connections	 are	 necessary.	 And	 that	 seems	 right,	 particularly	 once	 we	 get	 clear	about	 the	 structure	 of	 good.	Recall	 that	 sometimes	 it	 can	be	 good	 for	 a	 person	 to	change	her	circumstances	or	herself	dramatically.	It	is	highly	plausible	that,	at	least	once	 in	a	while,	 the	best	path	forward	through	life	 for	an	 individual	will	be	one	of	the	paths	that	requires	dramatic	self	change.	But	then	our	theory	will	say	dramatic	change	 is	 the	 best	 choice.	 And	 in	 these	 kinds	 of	 cases,	 even	 if	 we	 have	 great	confidence	 in	 our	 theory,	 we	 simply	 cannot	 guarantee	 that	 such	 facts	 will	 have	motivational	force	for	the	agents.				 To	help	make	clear	that	the	problem	is	not	specific	to	a	particular	theory,	I’ll	consider	two	examples.	For	the	first	I	will	assume	the	truth	of	hedonism,	and	for	the	second	the	truth	of	some	form	of	value	pluralism.			 Consider	Miserable	Maud,	a	religious	ascetic.34	She	believes	pleasures	come	from	the	devil	and	must	be	avoided	as	much	as	possible.	She	lives	her	life	in	a	way	that	 pretty	 successfully	 minimizes	 pleasure.	 But	 Maud	 is	 certainly	 capable	 of	experiencing	 pleasure	 and	 sometimes	 despite	 herself	 she	 experiences	 some.	According	 to	 hedonism	 the	 best	 path	 forward	 for	 Maud	 is	 one	 that	 leads	 her	 to	experience	a	great	deal	of	pleasure.	However,	Maud	is	unlikely	to	embark	on	such	a	path	without	a	dramatic	change	in	her	outlook,	since	her	current	attitudes	lead	her	to	 avoid	 pleasurable	 things	 and	 also	 serve	 to	 dampen	 her	 experience	 of	 the	 few	pleasures	she	unwittingly	stumbles	upon.	Not	only	 is	 the	best	 life	 for	Maud	one	 in	which	 she	 has	more	 pleasure,	 the	 best	 life	 is	 one	 in	which	 she	 changes	 herself	 in	ways	 that	 make	 it	 possible	 for	 her	 to	 experience	 much	 more	 pleasure	 than	 her	current	attitudes	allow.	Thus	if	hedonism	is	true	it	may	well	be	that	the	best	choice																																																									34	The	example	is	borrowed	from	Fletcher	(2016:	67-8).	
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for	Maud	now	is	to	begin	the	process	of	altering	her	religious	beliefs.	She	need	not	abandon	 religion.	 But	 she	 needs	 a	 religious	 view	 that	 (unlike	 her	 current	 one)	encourages	pleasure.	The	internalist	question	is	whether	we	can	expect	Maud	to	be	motivated	now	by	knowledge	of	the	descriptive	facts	about	how	much	pleasure	she	could	 experience	 if	 only	 she	 changed	 her	 beliefs.	 Is	 it	 likely	 that	 she	 would	 be	motivated	to	make	such	a	choice?	Absolutely	not!	From	her	current	position	she	has	zero	motivation	to	change.			 Of	 course,	 for	 all	 I	 have	 said	 so	 far,	 the	 problem	 could	 be	 a	 problem	with	hedonism	rather	than	motivational	internalism	about	potential	good.	If	hedonism	is	false,	then	it	will	not	be	surprising	if	someone	is	not	motivated	by	knowledge	of	facts	about	how	she	could	change	to	maximize	her	experience	of	pleasure.	However,	the	problem	arises	for	other	views	as	well.	To	see	this,	consider	the	next	example.			 Consider	 Miserable	 Martha.	 Martha	 is	 not	 always	 miserable,	 but	 she	 does	suffer	from	regular	bouts	of	serious	uni-polar	depression,	and	when	in	the	grips	of	these	 spells	 she	 is	miserable.	When	 she	 is	 not	 depressed	 she	 is	 quite	 artistic.	 She	strongly	suspects	that	part	of	what	contributes	to	the	quality	of	her	art	is	something	she	gains	from	her	depressive	spells.	Suppose	she	is	right.	And	suppose	she	has	the	following	 option:	 she	 could	 take	 a	 medication	 that	 would	 relieve	 her	 of	 her	depressions,	but	it	would	also	alter	slightly	her	personality.	She	would	be	capable	of	living	a	wonderful	life	as	the	person	she	would	become,	but	she	would	not	be	nearly	as	 creative	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 her	 artwork	would	 be	 significantly	 less.	 She	 could,	however,	 have	 healthy	 relationships	 that	 are	 currently	 impossible	 given	 her	recurrent	 depressions.	 And	 she	 could	 succeed	 in	 many	 other,	 equally	 gratifying,	though	non-artistic	pursuits.	Here	I	assume	a	pluralistic	view	of	welfare	that	allows	for	many	different	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	goods,	including	creative	production	of	art,	other	kinds	of	achievement,	and	relationships.			 Suppose	 the	 best	 possible	 continuation	 of	 Martha’s	 life—the	 one	 with	 the	greatest	 net	 positive	 intrinsic	 prudential	 value—is	 one	 of	 the	 lives	 she	 could	 lead	only	with	the	medication.	This	means	she	has	most	reason	right	now	to	give	up	her	artistic	pursuits,	take	the	medication,	and	embark	on	a	highly	different	path	through	life.	 Should	 we	 assume	 that	 the	 person	 she	 is	 now—during	 one	 of	 her	 non-
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depressed	moments—would	be	motivated	by	knowledge	of	these	facts?	Again,	recall	that	what	she	knows	are	just	the	descriptive	facts	about	what	her	life	will	have	in	it	and	what	it	will	be	like	for	her	once	she	becomes	the	post-medication	person.	Will	knowledge	of	such	facts	necessarily	motivate	her	to	choose	the	medication?	It	seems	clear	to	me	that	we	cannot	expect	this.	Indeed,	it	is	quite	likely	that	the	facts	won’t	motivate	 her	 at	 all,	 particularly	 if	 from	 her	 current	 position	 she	 can’t	 personally	identify	with	the	individual	she	would	become	if	she	pursued	that	path.			 I	don’t	think	this	is	a	problem.	We	shouldn’t	really	expect	her	to	be	motivated	by	 facts	 about	 her	 potential	 good	 that	 are	 so	 removed	 from	 her	 current	circumstances.	 The	 prudential	 goodness	 facts	 sometimes	 point	 in	 directions	 that,	from	our	limited,	current	perspectives,	seem	odd.	It	may	just	be	that	the	complexity	of	future	prudential	value	ensures	that	we	cannot	always	care	about	our	future	good	from	 afar.	 Motivational	 externalism	 about	 potential	 good	 begins	 to	 seem	 like	 the	sensible	option.			
§3.1	Two-Tier	Internalism?		 Before	 we	 settle	 for	 SC3,	 we	 should	 examine	 carefully	 the	 view	 of	 Connie	Rosati,	 labeled	 “two-tier	 internalism.”35	To-date	 this	 is	 the	 most	 well-developed	alternative	to	my	view.		 To	grasp	two-tier	internalism	we	need	a	couple	of	definitions.	First,	we	need	the	 notion	 of	 “ordinary	 optimal	 conditions.”	 These	 are	 just	 the	 conditions	 of	judgment	most	 of	 us	 occupy	most	 of	 the	 time.	 They	 exclude	 the	 obvious	 sorts	 of	conditions	that	distort	judgment	(or	make	it	impossible)—things	like	being	asleep,	being	drunk,	being	delusional,	being	in	a	state	of	intense	emotion,	or	being	clinically	depressed.36		 Second	we	need	 the	notion	of	 “ideally	authoritative	 conditions.”	This	 is	 the	idea	of	conditions	that	improve	judgment	to	the	point	where	it	can’t	go	wrong	and	which	are	authoritative	for	that	reason.	Most	of	us	realize	our	ordinary	 judgments																																																									35	Rosati	(1996:	307).	Alexander	Sarch	(2011)	argues	against	Rosati’s	two-tier	internalism.	However,	he	 does	 not	 contemplate	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 internalist	 constraint	 on	 realized	 good	 like	 the	 one	defended	here.		36	Rosati	(1996:	304-5).	
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are	 hampered	 by	 various	 limitations.	We	 lack	 knowledge.	We	 are	 prone	 to	many	forms	of	irrationality.	Thus,	it	is	natural	to	suppose	that	if	we	had	full	knowledge,	or	could	 be	 always	 rational	 our	 judgments	would	 presumably	 be	much	 better.	 If	we	push	 such	 ideas	 to	 the	 limit	 we	 arrive	 at	 the	 notion	 of	 ideally	 authoritative	conditions—the	set	of	epistemic	conditions	that	are	ideally	authoritative	for	making	judgments	about	prudential	value.37	I	shall	refer	to	these	conditions	as	C*.			 We	 can	 now	 explain	 two-tier	 internalism	 as	 follows.	 Consider	 a	 case	 of	
potential	good	(as	we	shall	see	it	works	the	same	way	for	realized	good).	Facts	about	potential	 good	 can	 typically	 be	 translated	 into	 claims	 about	 good	 choices	 in	 the	present.	So,	suppose	it	is	true	that	Y	is	the	best	choice	for	S	now.			 Speaking	 roughly,	 two-tier	 internalism	 requires	 first	 that	 S	 herself	 under	ideally	authoritative	conditions	recognize	this	fact	about	her	good	(that	Y	is	the	best	choice).	 For	 various	 reasons	 the	 actual	 requirement	 needs	 to	 be	 formulated	 in	 a	slightly	 more	 complicated	 way	 as	 follows:	 It	 must	 be	 true	 that	 in	 C*	 if	 S	contemplates	the	situation	of	her	actual	self	as	someone	about	to	assume	the	actual	
self’s	position,	she	would	want	her	actual	self	to	choose	Y.38			 The	 second	 requirement	 of	 two-tier	 internalism	 is	 that	 under	 ordinary	optimal	conditions	a	person,	S,	cares	about	what	she	would	want	in	C*.	This	means	that	even	 if	 in	ordinary	circumstances	 she	can’t	 recognize	 facts	about	her	good	as	
facts	about	her	good	(and	so	can’t	be	motivated	by	them),	she	still	cares	at	that	time	about	what	her	ideal	self	would	want	in	C*.	Of	course,	presently	she	can’t	make	 the	connection	between	what	 is	 really	good	 for	her	 (Y)	and	what	 the	 ideal	 self	would	want	 in	 C*.	 But	 the	 fact	 that	 right	 now	 she	 cares	 about	what	 her	 ideal	 self	would	want	 in	C*	means	that	 if	she	could	make	the	connection—if	she	could	come	to	see	that	 Y	 is	 what	 the	 ideal	 self	 would	 want	 in	 C*,	 she	 would	 right	 now	 have	 some	motivation	to	pursue	Y.	
																																																								37	Rosati	(1996:	304).		38	For	ease	of	exposition,	I	often	leave	out	these	details,	but	they	should	always	be	understood	to	be	present.	I	sometimes	use	short	phrases	like	“what	S	would	want	in	C*”	to	stand	in	for	longer	phrases	of	the	sort:	“what	S	would	want	in	C*	for	her	actual	self	if	she	were	contemplating	the	circumstances	of	her	actual	self	as	someone	about	to	assume	the	actual	self’s	position.”	
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	 Rosati	 clearly	 intends	 two-tier	 internalism	 to	 serve	as	 a	 constraint	on	both	facts	 about	 realized	 prudential	 good	 and	 facts	 about	potential	 prudential	 good.	 In	other	words,	she	does	not	make	the	modal	distinction	that	has	been	central	 to	my	discussion	so	far.	For	that	reason,	let	us	briefly	consider	in	turn,	two-tier	internalism	as	a	constraint	on	realized	good,	and	then	as	a	constraint	on	possible	good.			 Rosati	 and	 I	 agree	 that	 there	 is	 an	 internalist	 constraint	 on	 facts	 about	current	realized	intrinsic	good—that	there	must	be	some	kind	of	psychological	link	between	a	 subject	and	 facts	about	what	 is	good	 for	her	now.	We	simply	offer	 two	different	 accounts	 of	 what	 that	 constraint	 is.	 Like	 SC3,	 Rosati’s	 constraint	 is	 best	understood	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition	 only.	 Although	 two-tier	 internalism	 and	 SC3	are	naturally	understood	as	competing	accounts	of	a	single	constraint	on	facts	about	realized	 good,	 nothing	 rules	 out	 in	 advance	 the	 possibility	 that	 there	 are	 two	constraints.		 This	turns	out	to	be	relevant	in	the	following	way.	It	is	incredibly	difficult	to	undermine	the	two-tier	internalist	requirement	for	realized	good	directly.	To	do	so	we	would	need	to	have	a	clear	case	in	which	we	could	all	agree	that	something,	X,	is	currently	 good	 for	 a	 subject,	 S.	 And	we	would	 then	 need	 to	 establish	 in	 that	 case	two-tier	 internalism	 fails	 to	 hold.	 That	 would	 decisively	 show	 that	 the	 two-tier	constraint	is	not	necessary,	as	claimed.	However,	for	various	reasons,	it	is	incredibly	difficult	to	know	in	any	given	case	whether	or	not	two-tier	internalism	is	satisfied.	So	rather	than	undermine	it	directly,	my	aim	is	to	show	its	irrelevance.			 First,	 it	seems	to	me	that	no	matter	what	the	status	of	two-tier	 internalism,	we	 still	 need	 SC3	 in	 the	 case	 of	 realized	 goodness	 facts.	 Suppose,	 for	 example,	 a	theory	were	to	say	that	writing	is	intrinsically	good	for	Samia	at	the	very	time	when	she	 is	 so	 utterly	 indifferent	 to	 it.	 I	 confess,	 I	 simply	 can’t	 imagine	 anything	 that	would	convince	me	to	view	something	as	intrinsically	good	for	her	at	that	time	given	the	psychological	facts	about	her	at	that	time.	So	SC3	remains	necessary.	Second,	it	seems	important	to	note	that	one	of	the	prime	motivations	for	two-tier	internalism	fails	 in	 the	 case	 of	 realized	 goodness.	 Two-tier	 internalism	 was	 formulated	 in	response	 to	 worries	 about	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 subject	 to	 recognize	 and	 positively	respond	 to	 facts	 about	 her	 own	 good.	 It	 is	 designed	 to	 provide	 a	 kind	 of	 indirect	
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psychological	link	in	cases	where	a	direct	link	is	lacking.	But	once	we	make	the	modal	distinction,	and	recognize	the	importance	of	SC3	for	facts	about	realized	goodness,	we	 also	 see	 that	 indirect	 links	 are	 not	 needed,	 because	 direct	 links	 (currently	existing	links)	are	required.	SC3	rejects	any	theory	where	they	are	absent.	In	other	words,	once	we	focus	narrowly	on	facts	about	realized	good,	we	see	that	there	are	no	cases	in	which	X	is	currently	good	for	S,	S	is	aware	of	X,	but	S	as	she	actually	is	fails	to	respond	positively	to	X	in	any	way.	But	since	no	such	facts	exist,	there	is	no	need	to	salvage	internalism	for	these	cases	by	forging	an	indirect	link	through	facts	about	what	S	would	want	in	C*.			 Nonetheless,	 one	 might	 think	 that	 we	 need	 something	 like	 the	 two-tier	requirement	 when	 we	 focus	 on	 facts	 about	 possible	 good.	 It	 is	 unlikely	 that	 any	theory	of	welfare	will	be	able	to	ensure	that	agents	are	always	reliably	motivated	to	pursue	what	would	be	best	for	them.	But	one	might	hope	that	two-tier	internalism	could	 forge	 an	 indirect	 link	 between	 the	 facts	 about	potential	 individual	 good	 and	the	subject’s	current	motivations.				 Consider	again	Miserable	Martha	for	whom	(let	us	assume)	the	best	choice	is	medication	 and	 self-transformation.	 If	 the	 two-tier	 requirement	 is	 satisfied,	 this	means	both	(a)	 that	 in	C*	Martha	would	want	her	actual	self	 to	adopt	 the	 life	 that	medication	makes	possible,	and	(b)	right	now	(assuming	she	is	not	currently	in	the	grips	of	depression)	Martha	cares	about	what	her	 ideal	self	would	want	 in	C*.	The	question	 is	whether	 the	best	 theory	of	welfare	 can	 ensure	both	 that	Martha	 in	C*	wants	 the	 right	 things	and	 that	 actual	Martha	 cares	about	 the	desires	of	her	 ideal	self.	To	put	 the	point	more	dramatically,	 should	we	 reject	 a	 theory	of	welfare	 if	 it	fails	to	ensure	these	two	claims?	I	think	not.			 There	are	several	reasons	for	this,	though	I	grant	that	the	first	reason	is	not	widely	shared.	I	am	skeptical	of	the	idea	that	we	can	describe	a	set	of	ideal	epistemic	conditions	that	could	be	occupied	by	a	real	human	being	and	would	reliably	reveal	to	 this	human	occupant	all	 the	 truths	about	her	good.39	In	other	words	even	 if	we	make	sense	of	the	idea	of	an	agent	who	is	fully	informed	and	fully	rational,	I	have	no																																																									39	Similar	skepticism	is	expressed	by	Sobel	(1994)	and	Rosati	(1995).	
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faith	 that	 the	 pronouncements	 of	 such	 an	 idealized	 self	 would	 really	 track	 the	goodness	facts.	I	am	not	sure	we	should	trust	the	pronouncements	of	such	a	self.	Nor	do	I	think	there	is	some	way	to	amend	the	description	of	ideal	conditions	to	fix	the	problem.	 This	 is	 the	 basis	 for	 my	 skepticism	 about	 full	 information	 theories	 of	prudential	 good.	 But	 it	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 to	 accept	 two-tier	internalism,	 for	 although	 it	 is	 not	 a	 theory	 of	 prudential	 value,	 it	 is	 a	 proposed	constraint	on	such	theories.	If	there	is	no	C*	such	that	the	pronouncements	from	C*	are	 always	 correct,	 then	 we	 cannot	 require	 a	 theory	 of	 welfare	 to	 conform	 to	 a	restriction	that	appeals	to	C*.			 However,	even	if	one	does	not	share	my	skepticism	about	C*,	it	is	possible	to	raise	worries	about	two-tier	internalism.	Two-tier	internalism	assumes	that	there	is	some	description	of	ideal	conditions	C*	such	that	C*	satisfies	two	requirements.	On	the	one	hand,	C*	is	such	that	all	welfare	agents	view	C*	as	authoritative	(this	is	what	underwrites	the	confidence	that	under	ordinary	optimal	conditions	agents	will	care	about	what	 their	 ideal	 selves	want	 in	 C*).	 And	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 C*	 is	 such	 that	agents	in	C*	reliably	perceive	the	goodness	facts	(or	at	least	reliably	want	for	their	non-ideal	selves	the	things	that	are	really	good).	The	problem,	however,	is	that	there	may	be	no	C*	that	can	satisfy	both	conditions.			 Suppose	 for	 the	 sake	of	 argument	 that	 there	 is	 some	 set	 of	 ideal	 epistemic	conditions	C*	such	that	an	agent	 in	these	conditions	reliably	 judges	her	own	good.	Still,	 actual	agents	do	not	all	agree	about	what	 these	conditions	are.	Probably	 it	 is	true	for	the	vast	majority	of	people	that	there	is	some	description	or	other	of	better	epistemic	conditions	 they	would	accept	as	authoritative.	Let	us	call	 the	conditions	accepted	 by	Martha	 C+Martha,	 and	 the	 ones	 accepted	 by	Maud	 C+Maud.,	 and	 for	 each	person	 the	 conditions	 she	 would	 view	 as	 authoritative	 are	 C+hername.	 	 In	 ordinary	optimal	 conditions	Martha	 cares	what	 she	would	want	 in	 C+Martha	 and	Maud	 cares	what	 she	would	want	 in	 C+Maud.	 But	 unless	 C+Martha	 is	 the	 same	 as	 C*	 this	will	 not	forge	 a	 motivational	 link	 with	 the	 true	 goodness	 facts.	 In	 short,	 if	 people	 do	 not	generally	agree	about	ideally	authoritative	conditions,	then	even	if	there	is	a	C*	that	offers	 a	 reliable	 epistemic	 perspective	 on	 the	prudential	 goodness	 facts,	 it	will	 be	impossible	to	establish	an	indirect	motivational	link	from	individuals	to	those	facts.			
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	 It	 is	 important	 to	 remember	 that	many	people,	 even	when	 they	 are	 free	of	violent	emotion,	are	not	delusional,	and	so	on,	are	willing	to	grant	authority	to	less	than	 ideal	 judgments—judgments	 made	 without	 full	 information	 or	 that	 are	irrational	in	one	or	another	sense.	Nor	can	they	all	easily	be	brought	to	see	the	error	of	 their	epistemic	ways.	Even	 if	very	many	people	can,	we	have	 to	remember	 that	internalism	 is	 supposedly	 a	 necessary	 condition.	 My	 point	 is	 just	 that	 there	 is	 no	value	for	C*	such	that	C*	offers	the	right	kind	of	perspective	on	the	goodness	facts	
and	C*	is	viewed	as	authoritative	by	all	people	in	ordinary	optimal	conditions.	In	the	very	best	case	the	link	remains	highly	contingent.	Therefore	we	should	not	require	a	theory	of	welfare	to	satisfy	the	two-tier	internalism	requirement.		 Accepting	 motivational	 externalism	 about	 potential	 good	 might	 be	 more	distressing	if	we	were	also	externalists	about	realized	good.	To	embrace	a	dual	form	of	externalism	would	be	to	accept	that	the	psychology	of	individual	subjects	places	
no	 necessary	 constraint	 on	 prudential	 goodness	 facts.	 That	 does	 seem	 deeply	problematic.	 Since	most	 theorists	 until	 now	 have	 not	 distinguished	 realized	 good	and	 potential	 good	 and	 so	 have	 not	 considered	whether	 the	 constraints	 for	 each	might	be	different,	 it	 is	easy	to	see	why	a	claim	like	two-tier	 internalism	would	be	popular.	 But	 after	 reflection	 it	 seems	 that	 it	 just	 isn’t	 necessary.	 The	 right	 link	between	the	psychology	of	agents	and	goodness	facts	is	a	link	that	holds	when	basic,	
intrinsic	goodness	is	realized.	And	once	we	see	that,	we	see	we	have	all	we	need.			
§4		Conclusion			 We	have	 covered	a	 lot	 of	 ground.	 I	 first	 reviewed	my	understanding	of	 the	“structure	 of	 good,”	 emphasizing	 a	 modal	 distinction	 between	 realized	 intrinsic	prudential	goods	and	merely	potential	good.			 Against	 this	 backdrop	 I	 argued	 that	 we	 should	 understand	 existence	internalism	 for	 prudential	 value	 as	 a	 constraint	 on	 realized	 intrinsic	 good.	 In	 an	attempt—at	least	for	now—to	keep	the	formulation	of	the	constraint	broad	so	that	many	theories	might	satisfy	it,	I	proposed	the	following	formulation:			 	
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SC3:	A	necessary	condition	on	something,	X,	being	a	basic,	intrinsic	prudential	good	for	a	subject,	S,	at	a	time	T,	is	that:		(1) If	S	is	aware	of	X	at	T,	S	must	either	have	a	positive	response	to	X	at	T,	or	S	must	have	an	on-going	positive	engagement	with	X	that	still	holds	at	T,	or		(2) If	 S	 is	 unaware	of	X	 at	T,	 it	must	be	 true	 that	 S	would	have	had	 a	positive	response	to	X	at	T	if	she	had	been	aware	of	X	at	T.		This	is	a	merely	necessary	constraint.	Positive	response	should	be	taken	to	include	a	wide	range	of	positive	psychological	states.			 Having	defended	SC3	I	considered	whether	we	should	also	want	some	form	of	internalism	constraint	that	would	guarantee	that	subjects	are	motivated,	at	least	to	some	degree,	by	truths	about	their	own	potential	good.	We	should	not.	We	should	accept	 motivational	 externalism	 about	 potential	 good.	 Individuals	 will	 not	necessarily	be	motivated	to	seek	their	good,	but	if	they	seek	it,	and	get	it,	they	will	respond	positively	to	it.			 Finally,	I	considered	and	rejected	two-tier	internalism,	a	highly	sophisticated	attempt	 to	 forge	 an	 indirect	 link	 between	 prudential	 goodness	 facts	 and	 an	individual’s	motivations.	SC3	is	superior	to	two-tier	 internalism	when	we	focus	on	facts	about	realized	goodness.	And	in	the	case	of	potential	good	it	is	ultimately	wiser	to	accept	that	no	internalist	constraint,	even	an	indirect	one,	can	be	had.			
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